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STRATEGY RECOVERY FOR STOCHASTIC MEAN PAYOFF GAMES
MARCELLO MAMINO
Abstract. We prove that to find optimal positional strategies for stochastic mean
payoff games when the value of every state of the game is known, in general, is as
hard as solving such games tout court. This answers a question posed by Daniel
Andersson and Peter Bro Miltersen.
In this note, we consider perfect information 0-sum stochastic games, which,
for short, we will just call stochastic games. For us, a stochastic game is a finite
directed graph whose vertices we call states and whose edges we call transitions,
multiple edges and loops are allowed but no state can be a sink. To each state s
is associated an owner o(s) which is one of the two players Max and Min. Each
transition s A,p−−→t has an action A and a probability p ∈ Q∩ [0, 1], with the condition
that, for each state s, the probabilities of the transitions exiting s associated to the
same action must sum to 1. We say that the action A is available at state s if one
of the transitions exiting s is associated to A. Furthermore to each action A is
associated a reward r(A) ∈ Q.
A play of a stochastic game G begins in some state s0 and produces an unending
sequence of states {si}i∈N and actions {Ai}i∈N. At move i, the owner of the
current state si chooses an action Ai among those available at si, then one of
the transitions exiting si with action Ai is selected at random according to their
respective probabilities, and the next state si+1 is the destination of the chosen
transition. A play can be evaluated according to the β-discounted payoff criterion
vβ (A0,A1 . . .) = (1−β)
∞∑
i=0
r (Ai)β
i
for β ∈ [0, 1). Or it can be evaluated according to the mean payoff criterion
v1 (A0,A1 . . .) = lim inf
n→∞ 1n+ 1
n∑
i=0
r (Ai)
The goal of Max is to maximize the evaluation, that of Min is to minimize it. It is
known that for both criteria there are optimal strategies which are positional [Gil57,
LL69], namely such that the action chosen at si depends only on the state si –
an not, for instance, on the preceding states in the play, on i, or on a random
choice. Given two positional strategies σ and τ for Max and Min respectively,
and given β ∈ [0, 1], we denote vβ(G, s0,σ, τ) the expected value of vβ on all
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plays generated by σ and τ starting from s0. We write vβ(G, s0) for vβ(G, s0,σ, τ)
with σ and τ optimal. For basic information on stochastic games one may refer to
the book [FV97].
Given a stochastic game with probabilities and rewards encoded in binary, and
a value of β also encoded in binary, it makes sense to study the computational
complexity of the task of solving the game. Strategically solving a game, as defined
in [AM09], means to find a pair of optimal strategies. Quantitatively solving G
means to find vβ(G, s) for all states s. In general, the second task is easier than
the first. The strategy recovery problem is, given the quantitative solution of a game,
to produce a strategic solution. It has been observed in [AM09] that this task
can be performed trivially in linear time for discounted payoff games, and also,
but not trivially, for terminal payoff and simple stochastic games, hence it was
asked whether the same could be done for stochastic mean payoff games (this is,
indeed, the only missing element to complete Andersson and Miltersen’s picture).
Our aim is to prove that the strategy recovery problem for stochastic mean payoff
games is as hard as it possibly can.
Theorem 1. The strategy recovery problem for stochastic mean payoff games is equivalent,
modulo polynomial time Turing reductions, to the task of strategically solving mean payoff
games.
We will combine the reduction from stochastic mean payoff to discounted payoff
games proven in [AM09] with a new reduction from discounted to mean payoff
games of a special form that we call β-recurrent. Then we will show that β-
recurrent mean payoff games can be turned into strategically equivalent mean payoff
games having the additional property that all states have value 0. For this latter
class of games, the strategy recovery problem is obviously equivalent to solving
the games strategically.
Definition 2. Let G be a stochastic game and s0 one of the states of G. We define
the β-recurrent game associated to G and s0, denoted Gβ,s0 . The game Gβ,s0 has
the same state-space as G. Each transition a A,p−−→b in G is replaced by two new
transitions in Gβ,s0 , namely a
A,βp−−−→b and a A,(1−β)p−−−−−−−→s0. The first of these new
transitions will be called of the first kind, the second of the second kind. We say that a
game is β-recurrent if it results from the construction just defined, for some G.
Notice that our β-recurrent games are ergodic in the sense of [BEGM10]. The
complexity of ergodic games has been settled in a recent work [CIJ14a] (see the
full version [CIJ14b]), however we need for our reduction the extra properties
of β-recurrent games. Interestingly, the definition of ergodic in [CIJ14a] is more
restrictive than that in [BEGM10], and, in particular, in this stronger sense, a β-
recurrent game may not be ergodic, nor an ergodic game needs to be β-recurrent.
Lemma 3. The task of quantitatively solving stochastic discounted payoff games is
polynomial time Turing reducible to quantitatively solving β-recurrent stochastic mean
payoff games.
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Proof. Consider a stochastic game G and discount factor β. Let s0 denote a state
of G. We will show that
vβ (G, s0) = v1
(
Gβ,s0 , s0
)
Intuitively, an infinite play of Gβ,s0 can be seen as a sequence of finite sub-plays,
each of which lasts until a transition of the second kind is taken and the game is
reset to the initial state s0. Each sub-play lasts at least one move, but a second
move is played only with probability β, a third one with probability β2, and so
on, thus imitating the discounted payoff situation.
In order to prove the proposition, it suffices to show that, for any pair of positional
strategies σ and τ for Max and Min respectively, one has
(?) v1
(
Gβ,s0 , s0,σ, τ
)
= vβ (G, s0,σ, τ)
In fact, it follows from this equation that σ and τ are a pair of optimal positional
strategies for Gβ,s0 if and only if they are a pair of optimal positional strategies
for G with starting position s0.
It remains to prove equation (?). For each state s ofG, callAσ,τ(s) the action chosen
by either σ or τ (according to the owner of s) at the state s. The β-discounted
values of the states of G are determined by the condition
vβ (G, s,σ, τ) = (1−β) r (Aσ,τ (s)) +
∑
t∈G
βpσ,τ (s→ t) vβ (G, t,σ, τ)
where pσ,τ(v→ w) denotes the probability that, from state s, a transition to state t
is chosen when playing strategy σ against τ. If we call s0 . . . sn the states of G and
v¯β = (vβ(G, si,σ, τ))i=1...n the value vector of G, then the condition above can be
rewritten in the form
v¯β = (1−β) r¯+βPv¯β
where r¯ is the vector of the rewards r¯i = r(Aσ,τ(si)), and P denotes the matrix of
the transition probabilities Pi,j = pσ,τ(si → sj). Hence
v¯β = (1−β) (I−βP)
−1 r¯
where I denotes the n×n identity matrix.
Now we turn our attention to the mean payoff of the pair of strategies σ and τ
in Gβ,s0 . We can compute v1(Gβ,s0 , s0,σ, τ) averaging the rewards over the stable
distribution of the Markov chain induced by these strategies on the states of G.
This stable distribution µ must be unique, because, by virtue of Gβ,s0 being
β-recurrent, the Markov chain is connected. Moreover µ is determined by the
condition
µ (s) = (1−β) δs0 (s) +
∑
t∈G
βpσ,τ (t, s)µ (t)
where δs0(s) is 1 if s = s0 and 0 otherwise. Rewriting as above, we get
µ¯ = (1−β) e0 +βP
T µ¯
where e0 is the first element of the canonical basis and µ¯i = µ(si). Hence
µ¯ = (1−β)
(
I−βPT
)−1
e0
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Now, computing the average
v1
(
Gβ,s0 , s0,σ, τ
)
=
∑
s∈G
µ (s) r (Aσ,τ (s))
= µ¯T r¯
= eT0 (1−β) (I−βP)
−1 r¯
= eT0 v¯β
= vβ (G, s0,σ, τ) 
Lemma 4. The task of strategically solving β-recurrent stochastic mean payoff games is
polynomial time many-one reducible to the strategy recovery problem for stochastic mean
payoff games.
Proof. Let Gβ,s0 be a β-recurrent stochastic game. As we noticed, all the states
of Gβ,s0 have the same value. Nevertheless, we have no obvious way to determine
this value in order to complete the reduction. Instead, we choose to construct a
new mean payoff game G ′ in such a way that all the states of G ′ get mean payoff
value equal to 0, and nonetheless a pair of optimal strategies for Gβ,s0 can be
recovered from a pair of optimal strategies for G ′. This is clearly sufficient to
establish the lemma.
The game G ′ is constructed as two chained copies G1 and G2 of Gβ,s0 , redirecting
all the transitions of the second kind in each instance – that go to the state
corresponding to s0 in that instance – to the s0-state in the other. The states
of G1 have the same owner as in Gβ,s0 , and the transitions originating in G
1 are
associated to the same actions with the same rewards as in Gβ,s0 . In G2, however,
the owners are switched and the signs of the rewards exchanged (formally we
replace each action A with a new one A ′ having r(A ′) = −r(A)). If both players
play optimally, we may expect each to win in G1 precisely as much as he loses
in G2, hence, arguably the value of G ′ should be 0. On the other hand, in order
to play optimally in G ′, one should play optimally in both the components, so
we should be able to extract optimal positional strategies for Gβ,s0 from optimal
positional strategies for G ′ by mere restriction to the component G1. We will now
proceed to prove our statement.
Let us denote by s1 and s2 respectively the states of G1 and G2 corresponding to a
given state s of Gβ,s0 . First observe that a play of G
′, almost surely, will eventually
reach state s10, from this follows that all the states of G
′ must have the same value
(G ′ is ergodic). A positional strategy σ for Max in G ′ can be seen as a pair of
positional strategies (σ1,σ2) where σ1 is the strategy for Max in Gβ,s0 that we get
restricting σ to G1, and σ2 is the strategy for Min in Gβ,s0 that we get from the
restriction of σ to G2 (remember that in G2 the players are switched). Similarly a
strategy τ for Min in G ′ can be seen as a pair of strategies (τ1, τ2) in Gβ,s0 , the
first one for Min and the second for Max. We will prove that for any σ and τ
(??) v1
(
G ′, ·,σ, τ) = 1
2
v1
(
G, ·,σ1, τ1
)
−
1
2
v1
(
G, ·, τ2,σ2
)
From this equation, it follows at once that σ is an optimal strategy for G ′ if and
only if (σ1,σ2) is a pair of optimal strategies for Gβ,s0 , and, in particular, the
value of G ′ is 0.
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We turn now to the proof of equation (??). Consider the unique stable distribu-
tion µ of the Markov process induced by σ and τ. Observe that, independently
from σ and τ, at any given state, our Markov chain has probability β of transition-
ing to a state belonging to the same component, and probability 1−β of switching
component. It follows that the sequence of the components must obey the law of
a two-state Markov chain with transition matrix(
β 1−β
1−β β
)
Hence µ(G1) = µ(G2) = 1/2. It suffices to prove that the probability distribu-
tions µ1 and µ2 defined on the states of Gβ,s0 by µ
1(s) = 2µ(s1) and µ2 = 2µ(s2)
are the stable distributions induced on Gβ,s0 by the pairs of strategies (σ
1, τ1)
and (τ2,σ2) respectively.
By symmetry, we can concentrate on µ1. Let pσ,τ(t, s) denote the probability of
the transition t→ s in the Markov process induced by the strategies σ and τ. Since
all states of G1 except s10 are only reachable from within G
1 itself, the consistency
equation for µ being a stable distribution on G ′
µ (s) =
∑
t∈G ′
pσ,τ (t, s)µ (t)
implies the same condition for µ1 at all states except s0. At s0 one concludes by
direct computation observing that the component of the sum on the right hand
side due to transitions of the second kind must be
(1−β)µ
(
G2
)
=
1−β
2
= (1−β)µ
(
G1
)

Proof of Theorem 1. By [AM09, Theorem 1], solving stochastic mean payoff games
strategically is reducible to solving stochastic discounted payoff games quantita-
tively, which reduces, by Lemma 3, to solving β-recurrent stochastic mean payoff
games quantitatively. In turn, solving such β-recurrent games quantitatively is
reducible to solving the same strategically, just because they are, in particular,
stochastic mean payoff games. By Lemma 4, this final task is reducible to the
strategy recovery problem for stochastic mean payoff games. 
Finally, we would like to remark that our construction relies on the interpretation
of strategic solution as requiring optimal positional strategies. Were a more general
class of strategies available, then the problem of finding an optimal one would
become easier. In particular, the games produced by Lemma 4 happen to be
symmetric under switching the players and the signs of the rewards. Under this
circumstance, it would not be surprising if one could play optimally by some form
of strategy stealing technique.
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